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PARTICULAR PROBLEMS OF WATER POLLUTION
UNDER NEW YORK LAW AND FEDERAL LAW
A SUMMARY OF THE RIGHT OF A RIPARIAN TO POLLUTE A
STREAM UNDER THE NEW YORK COMMON LAW
W HILE many types of water may be polluted, such as lakes, ponds,
underground waters, percolating waters, and the like, this discussion
will be confined to the right of a riparian to pollute a stream under the
New York common law.1
There are two general theories of law which control the use of water:
the doctrine of riparian rights and the doctrine of prior appropriation. While
the latter doctrine has been adopted in many western states for reasons
peculiar to those regions, 2 the use of water in New York has long been
subject to the doctrine of riparian rights.
Just as there are different types of water which may be polluted, so
there are two classifications of streams subject to pollution, namely, navigable
and non-navigable. Though the basic principles of law controlling pollution
are the same for either type, the common law does make some distinctions.
One court has said,
The general rule is that a riparian owner in a non-navigable fresh
water stream is entitled to have the water that passes his land free
from pollution. . . . As to tidal [navigable] waters, the rule is that
riparian owners are not entitled to have such waters free from
pollution. . ..
The distinctions, however, are neither this basic nor this simple.
As is true with virtually all legal rights, the right of a riparian to pollute
can only be defined in relation to the rights of other riparians or non-riparians
to have the stream free from pollution. In addition, this right does not
lend itself to an all inclusive verbal definition, although many courts and
writers have attempted it. Instead, the right of a riparian to pollute must
be defined on a case by case basis. While the following paragraphs are
primarily concerned with non-navigable streams, much of what is said is
also true of navigable stream pollution.
1. The rights of a non-riparian to use streams will only be incidentally considered.
2. Clyde, Current Developments in Water Law, 53 Northwestern L. Rev. 755 (1959).
The basic distinction between these two doctrines is that under the doctrine of riparian
rights, the right of each riparian is only to make reasonable use of the stream in view of
the reasonable interests of other riparians, and the use is confined to the riparian land, i.e.,
the water basin drained by this body or water. See note 4 infra.
Under the doctrine of prior appropriation, however, an appropriator of water is
entitled, as against all subsequent users, to the exclusive use of the water to the extent of
his appropriation at the time the second user comes into being, and this water can be
used on any land to which it can be transferred. See: Snake Creek Mining & Tunnel Co. v.
Midway Irrigation Co., 260 U.S. 596 (1923); Rogers v. Nevada Canal Co., 60 Colo. 59,
151 P. 923 (1915).
3. Squaw Island Freight Terminal Co. v. City of Buffalo, 273 N.Y. 119, 127, 7 N.E.2d
10, 12 (1937).
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The general principles which regulate the rights of riparians to pollute
a stream under the common law of New York, insofar as they are susceptible
to being briefly stated, have been effectively summarized by one court as
follows:
It is well settled that while a riparian owner does not own the
running water, he has a right to a reasonable use of it as it passes
by his land. All other owners upon the same stream have the same
rights, the right in no one is absolute but is qualified by the rights of
the others to have the stream substantially preserved in its natural
size, flow, and purity and to protect it against material and unreason-
able diversion or pollution.
The enjoyment of each, however, must be according to his
opportunity; the upper owner has the first chance. The lower owner
must submit to such loss or pollution as is caused by reasonable use.
Whether or not use or detention of water is reasonable must be
determined by the extent and capacity of the stream, the use to which
it has been put and the rights that other owners upon the same
stream may have.4
This concept of reasonable use is the basic criterion of the right of a
riparian to pollute a stream.5 When ever the word "reasonable" is employed
in a legal context, it almost invariably implies a question of fact. So it is
with the issue of pollution. What constitutes reasonable or unreasonable
pollution is a question of fact, except in those instances where pollution is
so minimal or so gross that it becomes a question of law.0 With these
principles in mind, the factors which the courts take into consideration in
their application can best be illustrated by a discussion of several of the
cases which have arisen.
In the case of Prentice v. Geiger,7 the lower riparian constructed a dam
to operate his mill. The reasonableness of this act was not questioned. The
upper riparian also operated a mill and discharged sawdust into the stream,
not only during those months when the level of water was high, but also during
the summer when the water level was low. Consequently, during the summer
months there was not sufficient water in the stream to carry the dust over
the lower riparian's dam, so that sawdust gradually filled up the pond, thereby
reducing the water's depth and the lower riparian commenced an action for
damages. The jury found the discharging of the sawdust into the stream
4. Kyser v. New York Central R. Co., 151 Mfisc. 226, 228, 271 N.Y. Supp. 182, 185
(Sup. Ct. 1934).
While this is a lower court case, the accuracy of the statement will be borne out by
cases of higher courts to be mentioned infra. See: United Paper Board Co. v. Iroquois
Pulp Co., 226 N.Y. 38, 45, 123 N.E. 200, 202 (1919).
5. The reasonable use concept is also applied when the propriety of uses of streams
other than pollution is in question. See: Henderson Estate Co. v. Carroll Electric Co.,
113 App. Div. 775, 99 N.Y. Supp. 365 (2d Dep't 1906), aff'd, 189 N.Y. 531, 82 N.E. 1127
(1907); Pierson v. Speyer, 178 N.Y. 270, 70 N.E. 799 (1904).
6. Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 164 N.Y. 303, 321, 58 N.E. 142, 147 (1900); Prentice v.
Geiger, 74 N.Y. 341, 345 (1878).
7. 74 N.Y. 341 (1878).
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to be an unreasonable use and the Court of Appeals held that the fact justified
this verdict.
The facts of the case of Kyser v. New York Central R. Co.8 found the
railroad discharging sewage and other foreign mateals into a fairly large
but non-navigable stream. The lower riparian did not use the stream for
domestic purposes, but to operate a mill. In addition, the lower riparian
had always maintained catch basins which were periodically cleaned, thus
only liquid or very small solid foreign materials entered the works of the
mill. The court denied the lower riparian's suit for an injunction for three
reasons. The lower riparian did not use this water domestically and therefore
upper riparians could reasonably be allowed to discharge more foreign sub-
stances into the stream. Secondly, the lower riparian's own practice of
maintaining catch basins prevented any materials which would damage the
mill from entering the works. Finally, the size of the stream was such that
more polluting substances could reasonably be discharged into it than if it
were only a small stream. Thus, the use to which the lower riparian put the
stream plus the capacity of the stream to dissolve foreign matter were the
controlling factors.
A stream which had its source in a pure spring flowed through the
lower riparian's land. He collected this water in a pond and used it domestic-
ally as well as to breed fish and to procure ice. A municipality then constructed
a sewer which drained into the creek above his land. The "effect was to render
the water unfit for domestic use and to cover the banks with filthy sediment.
These were the facts of Chapman v. City of Rochester9 The Court of Appeals
held the lower riparian to be entitled to both damages and injunctive relief
for rather obvious reasons.
The operation of a duck farm on the banks of a stream in an area in
which the raising of ducks had been engaged in for many years was held not
to constitute an unreasonable use even though fecal matter was discharged
into the stream. Some of the more important factors which influenced the
court's decision were that the upper riparian had invested a considerable
amount of money in his farm, while the lower riparian was not engaged in
any use of the stream, so this material did no more than occasionally annoy
the latter by its odor or appearance. In addition, the court felt that since
the plaintiff moved into this area full-well realizing the presence of duck
farming, this annoyance which such farming caused her should not be en-
joined.'0 Likewise, the discharge of water colored with dye into a stream by
a factory engaged in the manufacture of colored fabrics was held to be a
8. Supra note 4.
9. 110 N.Y. 273, 18 N.E. 88 (1888).
10. Michelson v. Leskowicz, 55 N.Y.S.2d 831 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd, 270 App. Div.
1042, 63 N.Y.S.2d 191 (2d Dep't 1946).
The weight which New York courts give to the fact that one riparian used the water
first is open to question. The factor will be discussed at a later point.
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reasonable use with the lower riparian not being entitled to injunctive relief."
While the case does not say exactly what use the lower riparian was making
of the water, the advisory jury verdict found that the foreign material
discharged into the stream did not render it unfit for manufacturing, mechan-
ical, or domestic use. This would indicate that the pollution was not very
serious.
The facts of Reese v. City of Johnstown12 found a lower riparian seeking
to have the upper riparian, a municipality, enjoined from discharging sewage
into a stream. The injunction was denied because the lower riparian was also
discharging sewage and other foreign material into the stream and the court
stated that the upper riparian should not be enjoined from doing what the
lower riparian is also engaged in. Practically and legally speaking, however,
there would seem to be a possibility that even though the upper and lower
riparian were engaged in precisely the same type of pollution, the lower
might be entitled to injunctive relief against the upper. On the other hand,
if the court's position is viewed as an indirect statement of the "clean hands"
doctrine, it is legally sound. A second reason for denying the injunction was
that the greatest portion of the pollution affecting the lower riparian was
coming from upper riparians other than the defendant. This reasoning,
however, appears contrary to both the holdings of other cases and public
policy. From the viewpoint of public policy it would seem most undesirable
to refuse to enjoin 'one person who is engaged in harmful pollution activities
simply because there are other persons who are at least equally at fault.
The courts, on the other hand, have consistently held that the existence of
several wrongdoers does not absolve an individual wrongdoer. In the case of
Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co.13 suit was brought to enjoin a mining company from
polluting a stream with salt. The Court of Appeals expressly said, "The
fact that other salt manufacturers are doing the same thing as the defendant
instead of preventing relief, may require it."'14 The Townsend case also
said, ". . . no degree of pollution by others would justify an unlawful or
unreasonable use of the stream by the defendants."' 5, Therefore it would
appear that in view of the equities involved in the Reese case it may have
been a correct decision but that it is not an accurate reflection of the state
of the law.
Another factor which the courts sometimes take into consideration in
determining the reasonableness of pollution can be expressed as it was in
the Strobel case: "It is also material, sometimes, to ascertain which party
first erected his works and began to appropriate the water."' 6 The Court of
11. Townsend V. Bell, 167 N.Y. 462, 60 N.E. 757 (1901).
12. 45 Misc. 432, 92 N.Y. Supp. 728 (Sup. Ct. 1904).
13. 164 N.Y. 303, 58 N.E. 142 (1900).
14. Id. at 322, 58 N.E. 148.
15. Supra note 11 at 470, 60 N.E. 759 (1901).
16. Supra note 14 at 321, 58 N.E. 147 (1900).
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Appeals has issued inconsistent dicta on this issue. In a 1907 case, the
judge writing the majority opinion stated that it would be better "that
profits should be somewhat reduced than to compel a householder to abandon
his home, especially when he did not come to the nuisance; but was there
before.' 7 The Squaw Island case, however, suggested a contrary approach.
The court stated that if a factory emits noxious odors and later someone
purchases nearby land and constructs a house thereon, the factory may be
compelled to curtail its pollution of the air, even though the house owner
moved into this area of his own will.' 8 In a third Court of Appeals case, the
Prentice case, in which, it will be recalled, the court enjoined the defendant
upper riparian from discharging sawdust into a stream which began to fill
up the pond created by plaintiff's dam, the court said, "The plaintiff's mill
was built before the original mill on the defendant's land . . ."19 Although
the court mentioned this fact only in passing, an dit cannot be classified as
either dicta or a holding, it would seem to be an earlier expression of the
view of the 1907 case that the party who was there first is entitled to the
benefit of some doubt when an action is commenced either by or against
him to discourage further pollution. This point has never been directly ruled
upon, however, but merely alluded to as indicated above. Therefore one
cannot say precisely how much weight this factor is given or, in fact, if it is
given any weight at all. If the time were ever to come, however, when a
court would be squarely faced with the issue of what effect the fact that
one riparian had located on the stream before the other should have on
their respective rights to use this stream, the view that it should have no
effect would seem to be preferable. The reasons for this choice can best
be stated in negative terms, that is, why the contrary view would not be
desirable. If the first user were given the right to continue this use regardless
of who else might later use the stream, the uses to which the stream could
be put would be at least limited to those which would not unreasonably inter-
fere with the use of the first riparian. In view of the rapid rate of change
in our present society, such a restriction would not be desireable. In addition,
adoption of the view that the first riparian's use could not be interfered with
would result in the other riparians being denied the reasonable use of property,
which they are entitled to use, without compensation. If the later riparians
were also lower riparians, it might even be said that the first riparian would
have virtually acquired an easement.
On the other hand, there is one important factor which would suggest
that the first riparian should be given some preference. If a person is consid-
ering constructing a large plant, or some other structure requiring large
investment, upon a stream, knowledge of the fact that he might later be
17. McCarty v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N.Y. 40, 50, 81 N.E. 549, 551 (1907).
18. Squaw Island Freight Terminal Co. v. City of Buffalo, 273 N.Y. 119, 7 N.E.2d
10 (1937).
19. Supra note 7, at 344 (1878).
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required to curtail these operations because of the rights of the later riparians,
might tend to discourage such an investment.
When a stream is defined as navigable,20 right of riparians to pollute
it are basically controlled by the above principles, but peculiar problems do
arise.
The question of a stream's navigability is not too often raised in cases
when pollution is the only issue. For, as was mentioned above, the determining
factor is the reasonableness of the pollution. Since navigable streams are
usually larger than non-navigable ones, this increased size is simply another
factor to be considered in determining this reasonableness. 21 Instead, the
question of navigable streams is most often raised when the state seeks to
divert water from the stream and a private riparian argues this cannot be
done without compensating him. Or, a private riparian may attempt to
divert water and the state argues this cannot be done without first obtaining
a license or some other form of permission from the state. The outcome of
such cases often turn on the issue of where title to the bed of the stream
lies32 On this point there is some disagreement. While this problem is not
directly relevant to this discussion, a brief allusion to it is not unjustifiable.23
20. What constitutes a "navigable stream" is a problem area in and of itself which
is beyond the scope of this discussion. For a discussion of some of the problems involved
see People ex rel. Loomis v. The Canal Appraisers, 33 N.Y. 461 (1865).
21. Rights and Remedies in the Law of Stream Pollution, 35 Virginia L. Rev.
774-780, esp. 775-776 (1949).
22. Many New York statutes would also affect such cases. This discussion is confined
to the common law.
23. One of the leading New York cases involving the issue of the navigability of a
stream and title to its bed is that of People ex rel. Loomis v. The Canal Appraisers, 33
N.Y. 461 (1865). The State of New York diverted water from the navigable Mohawk
river to furnish water for the Erie Canal. This diversion worked toward the disadvantage
of lower riparians who used the water as a source of power, and an action for damages
was commenced. The Court of Appeals held that title to the bed of all navigable streams
rests in the State of New York. Therefore, a riparian has no claim for damages when the
State diverts water from a navigable stream because he has no title to the bed. Smith et
al. v. City of Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463 (1883) adopts essentially the same position.
In 1924, however, the Appellate Division decided the case of Waterford Electric
Light, H. & P. Co. v. State 208 App. Div. 273, 203 N.Y. Supp. 858 (3d Dep't), which
seemed to seriously challenge the holding of the Canal Appraisers case. The court stated,
That the riparian owners upon fresh water rivers, whether navigable or not, own
to the thread of the stream, is a general proposition, which although denied in
[Canal Appraisers case] is now firmly established in this state.
(Waterford case at 281, 866).
Thus, this decision seems to classify navigable streams as either fresh or salt water
streams, with the riparian possessing title to the bed of the former type, while, by im-
plication, the state owns title to the bed of a salt water navigable stream. The Squaw
Island case also adopts this distinction by implication. See the quotation from that case
which appears on the opening page of this discussion.
A supreme court case has said, "Where the State owns the bed of the stream it is not
answerable to a riparian owner for the diversion of the water." And, when the state does
not own the bed the state ". . . cannot divert the channel without paying damages."
Niagara Falls Power Co. v. Duryea, 185 Misc. 696, 703, 57 N.Y.S.2d 777, 784 (Sup. Ct.
1945). But the case does not make any distinctions between fresh and salt water streams
and therefore is of little assistance in resolving the principal issue, namely, to what type
of navigable stream does the state own the bed? The answer to this question is not
settled in New York, despite the apparent conviction of the Appellate Division to the
contrary.
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The issue of pollution of a navigable stream, however, has arisen in at
least one leading New York case, that of Squaw Island Freight Terminal Co.
v. City of BuffaloY 4 The lower riparian purchased Squaw Island which is
located in the Niagara river. New York State subsequently (in 1882) author-
ized the City of Buffalo to construct a sewer which would empty into the
Niagara above Squaw Island. In 1922 the plaintiff, under a federal license,
constructed a harbor or bay on its island for commercial usage. Soon sewage
began to settle in the harbor and by 1927 the gravel, etc. on the floor of the
harbor was so covered with sewage that it was useless for commercial pur-
poses. The lower riparian commenced an action to enjoin the City from
polluting the river so as to damage plaintiff's property.
The trial court found for the City on the ground that the excavation
made by the lower riparian in constructing the harbor had increased the
width of the river, thereby slowing the current at that point and causing
the sewage to settle. In other words, the trial court felt that the plaintiff's
damages were of his own making.
The Appellate Division2 5 reversed the trial court and certified six
questions to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals modified, but
affirmed the Appellate Division and remanded the case to fix the terms of
the injunction. The Court of Appeals held that while the dredging done by
the plaintiff may have contributed to the damage, "The plaintiff . . .was
doing what it had a perfect right to do."-26 The dissent, in agreeing with the
trial court, argued that, under* these circumstances, the permanent alteration
in the width of the river was not a reasonable use to which a riparian could
put a navigable river.
In the course of its opinion, the majority said,
The rule permitting the pollution of tidal [navigable] waters has
been always subject to the limitation that in the absence of express
sanction the pollution must not result in a direct trespass or nuisance
to the property of riparian owners 27
This statement indicates that the right of a riparian to pollute a navigable
stream is greater than the right to pollute a non-navigable stream, but that
it is not absolute. The court said the pollution must not constitute a "direct
trespass or nuisance to the property of riparian owners." If, by this phrase
the court meant "reasonable use," (for, in the last analysis, this is the basic
criterion for determining the lawfulness of the pollution of either a navigable
or non-navigable stream), and was simply trying to state this criterion in a
more specific manner, this phrase does not appear to be of much assistance.
While the concept of a direct trespass or nuisance is one of long standing
24. 273 N.Y. 119, 7 N.E.2d 10 (1937).
25. 246 App. Div. 472, 284 N.Y. Supp. 598 (4th Dep't 1936).
26. Supra note 24, at 129, 7 N.E.2d 13 (1937).
27. Id. at 128, 7 N.E.2d 13.
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in tort law, it would appear that the limitations on the right to pollute a
navigable stream could be more accurately expressed in terms of balancing
the various interests of the riparians as well as those of the non-riparians.
Residential riparians are the source of relatively few cases involving unrea-
sonable pollution of a navigable stream. Because of the largeness of most
navigable streams, their banks are almost invariably populated by municipali-
ties and large private industry. To the municipality, the stream is both a
source and a depository. A large supply of useable water is essential. On
the other hand, the stream is an effective, convenient and economic receptacle
for the municipality's sewage. To private industry, a navigable stream, while
often used as a source of water for its manufacturing processes, it is more
often used as a means of disposing of waste materials. Because of the
constant, powerful motion of navigable streams, they are capable of dis-
solving large quantities of foreign matter. This capacity, however, is not
unlimited. Therefore, when a municipality is a lower riparian, the upper
riparian must not pollute to such an extent so as to make the use of the
water by the municipality dangerous to the welfare of its inhabitants. On
the other hand, when the municipality is an upper riparian, it must not dis-
charge its sewage into the stream in such quantities and in such untreated
condition that the water becomes unusable or dangerous to lower riparians,
whether industrial or residential. If, however, the public good clearly required
that degree of pollution, the lower riparian would seem to be entitled to
compensation from the public for his loss.
The interest of the non-riparian public in maintaining the wholesome
condition of navigable streams must also be recognized. No riparian should
be permitted to discharge that type of foreign material into a navigable
stream so that its value as a navigable stream, a natural resource, a habitat
for fish, a residential attraction, or a source of recreation is unreasonably
impaired, again subject to the exception of the unavoidable requirements of
the public good. It might be noted that this statement would not be irrelevant
to non-navigable streams as well.
Admittedly, such a phrasing of the limitation would only substitute one
question for another. But it would seem that the suggested substitute would
more readily lend itself to being answered in view of its more realistic
statement of the basic problem, which is a balancing of the various interests
involved.
In the Squaw Island case, not only the dissent, but the majority as
well, indicated that title to the bed of the Niagara rested with the state.
Despite this fact, a political subdivision of the state was enjoined from
polluting the river. Therefore, it appears that when the issue is the right
to pollute a navigable stream, the question of who has title to the bed is
of less importance than when the right to divert water from a navigable
stream is in issue.
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From the preceding discussion it would appear to be clear that no
riparian, whether public or private, has an absolute right to pollute a stream,
whether navigable or non-navigable. In fact, the Court of Appeals has held
that when a riparian is injured through pollution, the character of the
defendant, whether public or private, will not prevent its being subjected
to a proper remedy.28 But, as the preceding discussion also indicated, the
character of both parties would be relevant to determining the degree of
pollution which may occur before it is considered unreasonable.
The most serious pollution problems, other than those involving munici-
palities, usually have their source in some commercial venture or manufacturing
process. Yet, the necessity of encouraging and promoting industrial investmeut
is more obvious in our society of today than it ever has been before. Therefore
the question has arisen whether industrial enterprises are to be dealt with
more leniently under the law of pollution than are non-industrial riparians
in an attempt to encourage industrial development. There are varying answers
to this question in the several states.&2 9 In New York, however, the courts
have clearly established that industrial riparians must conform to the same
law as do other private riparians.
The leading case on this important subject is that of Strobel v. Kerr
Salt Co.30 The defendant upper riparian established a salt mine on the
banks of a stream which, prior to the mining operations, contained fresh
water. The defendant, however, employed the stream in its mining process.
As a result, the stream developed a high salt content. Animals refused to
drink the water, fish were killed, vegetation along its banks died, the
machinery of lower riparians who employed the stream to operate mills, etc.,
began to rust and deteriorate. Under these undisputed facts the lower riparians
sought injunctive relief. The trial court found for the defendant. The rea-
soning of the trial court was that salt mining was a lawful endeavor which
could only be engaged in where salt was found. In addition, the defendant
mining company was a riparian with the right to make reasonable use of
the stream as it flowed by its property. In view of the necessity of operating
where salt was found, the defendant's only obligation was not to inflict any
unneccessary injury upon the lower riparians. The Court of Appeals, in a
sharply worded opinion, reversed the trial court.
The view taken by the trial court, however, was not without support,
28. Chapman v. City of Rochester, 110 N.Y. 273, 18 N.E. 88 (1888).
There was a time in New York, however, when municipalities were immune from suit
when engaged in a "governmental" function. This point will be discussed later. But the
above case, having been decided in 1888, could only have been referring to "corporate '
municipal functions, for at that time, state immunity was in full force and effect.
29. The hydraulic method of mining employed in the western states in the late 19th
and early 20th century raised this question, among others, in its most serious form. See:
Riparian Rights and the "Necessary Industry Doctrine." Stream Pollution-Injunction
Against-Damages For-31 Notre Dame Law. 69 (1942).
30. 164 N.Y. 303, 58 N.E. 142 (1900).
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at least in other jurisdictions. Pennsylvania, in a case decided late in the
last century,31 adopted the view that the pumping of water from coal mines,
along with all the sediments carried by such water, into previously pure
streams was not unlawful. The Pennsylvania court based its holding on the
importance of the coal mining industry to the economy of that state and
that the injury suffered by lower riparians would not justify obstructing the
public good in which the mining industry was instrumental.
The Court of Appeals recognized the Pennsylvania position but decided
not to follow it. The Court indicated that it had information to the effect
that Pennsylvania, in more recent cases, had modified and limited this early
case. Even if that were not true, however, the Court of Appeals would not
have reached a different conclusion because it simply disagreed with this view.
The Court of Appeals pointedly stated, "There is nothing about this
case . . . to take it out of the general rules governing the rights of riparian
owners." 32 The court then proceeded to state what appears to be the present
approach of the New York courts to the problem of industrial pollution.
The lower riparian owners are entitled to a fair participation in the
use of the water, and their right cannot be cut down by the conven-
ience or necessity of the defendant's business. . . .While the courts
will not overlook the needs of important manufacturing interests, nor
hamper them for trifling causes, they will not permit substantial
injury to neighboring property, with a small but long-established
business, for the purpose of enabling a new and great industry to
flourish. They will not change the law relating to ownership and
use of property in order to accommodate business enterprise.38
Little can be said in elaboration upon this rather clear statement of the
New York view. While it is certainly not the only position that could have
been adopted, it appears to be a fair and desireable one. As is true with
the abstract statement of any general rule, however, its practical application
poses serious problems.
An earlier Court of Appeals case, that of Prentice v. Geiger, which was
mentioned earlier in this discussion in another context, 34 also addressed itself
to the problem of industrial pollution. That court said,
The public interest is promoted by the erection of mills and manu-
factories; and to ... [prohibit] the use of the water for propelling
machinery, if to any extent it interfered with the use of the stream
by other owners would produce great public inconvenience, and
prevent, in most cases, the beneficial use, and render unavailable the
31. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. St. 126 (1886).
32. Supra note 30, at 320, 58 N.E. 147 (1900). Following this statement, the court
gave a detailed statement of the general rules governing riparian rights which is often
quoted by other courts and writers.
33. Id. at 321-322, 58 N.E. 147.
34. Supra note 7. This case involved the sawdust which was discharged by the
upper riparian filling up the pond of the lower riparian.
482
PARTICULAR PROBLEMS OF WAT.9R POLLUTION
water-power furnished by the streams and watercourses of the
country.35
That court in no way contradicted the Strobel case, but simply held that
industry was also entitled to make reasonable use of streams. 36 The Strobel
case certainly concurs in this view.
The next area of the right of riparian to pollute a stream under the
New York common law to be considered is the availability of a prescriptive
right to pollute. A relatively recent Appellate Division case on this subject
is that of Jones v. Berger Ice Cream Co. 3 7 The plaintiff charged the defendant
with discharging refuse and sewage into a pond which the former owned,38
and sought an injunction and damages. The defendant set up the affirmative
defense that he had acquired a prescriptive right to continue to discharge
waste material into this pond by reason of having done so for over fifteen
years. In denying the plaintiff's motion to strike this defense the court
distinguished between a private and a public nuisance. A prescriptive right
to pollute can be acquired if the pollution only amount to a private nuisance.
Such a right cannot be acquired, however, if the pollution constitutes a public
nuisance or if the use is in violation of any statute.
While this distinction is traditional in the law of torts, the line between
a private and a public nuisance often becomes quite fine.
Once a prescriptive right is acquired, the person acquiring this right
ddes not then become free to engage in any type of pollution he so desires.
Future pollution must be strictly confined to that type through which the
prescriptive right was acquired.
39
Under the New York common law, it has long been settled that riparians
can contract, execute leases, deeds, or engage in other grantor-grantee relation-
ships under which the right to pollute is conveyed or regulated by the agree-
ment among the riparians or interested non-riparians. When such arrangements
are entered into, the law of contracts, or landlord and tenant, or other relevant
law controls, with the law of riparian rights being only of secondary
importance.40
Earlier in this discussion it was mentioned that the character of the
defendant was not relevant in determining the remedy available to a lower
riparian who has been injured by pollution. Footnote twenty-eight pointed out,
however, that this was not always the case. Prior to 1939, the state, or any
political subdivision thereof, was immune from suit for injuries which occurred
35. Id. at 345.
36. It will be recalled that the discharge of the sawdust into the stream was found
to be an unreasonable use under existing circumstances.
37. 1 A.D.2d 253, 149 N.Y.S.2d 426 (4th Dep't 1956).
38. While this case does not involve a stream, the principles which it states would
be equally applicable to streams.
39. II Farnham, The Law of Waters and Water Rights, 1707 (1904).
40. United Paper Board Co. v. Iroquois Pulp and Paper Co., 226 N.Y. 38, 123 N.E.
200 (1919).
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as a result of the performance of its "governmental" as opposed to its "quasi
private or corporate" functions.41 Therefore if the state unreasonably polluted
a stream in the course of performing a "governmental" function, it was immune
from any action by other riparians. A 1900 case will serve as an example.42
The county maintained a penitentiary, almshouse, and insane asylum on
land which bordered a stream. The county discharged garbage and other
waste materials into the stream, clearly to the injury of the lower riparian.
The latter filed a suit against the county which was dismissed. In affirming
the dismissal the Court of Appeals found that operating these institutions
was a "governmental" function and therefore the county was immune from
suit. Recognizing the difficult position in which this left the plaintiff, the
Court suggested that instead of suing the county directly, that the plaintiff
bring an action against the board of supervisors as individuals and seek an
injunction which would act upon them as individuals and thereby abate
the pollution.
The artificial distinctions which were shot through the instant case, and
the many others like it, were finally abolished in 1939 by the enactment of
Section 8 of the Court of Claims Act. That enactment provides that the state
and all of its political subdivisions now waive any immunity from suit which
they might possess and are now subject to judicial proceedings in the same
manner as any other private person.
CONCLUSION
The basic criterion of the right of a riparian to pollute a stream under
the common law of New York is that of reasonable use. The factual question
raised by this criterion must be. determined on a case by case basis. In each
case, the reasonableness of the pollution is influenced by many factors. Some
of the more important ones are whether the stream is navigable or non-
navigable, the size of the stream, whether the riparians are public or private,
industrial or residential, and the purpose for which the water is being used.
This common law of pollution is still an active force today in the constant
quest for the most desirable allocation of our water resources. But as this
quest becomes more rapid and more complex, enactments of the legislature
become increasingly necessary.
A SURVEY OF COMMON LAW REMEDIES FOR STREAM POLLUTION
IN NEW YORK
The purpose of this note is to examine the common law remedies available
to a riparian owner who has been injured by the pollution of the stream on
which he owns land. It will be asssumed that an upper riparian owner (or
41. The problem of defining the limits of these two types of functions has occupied
the time of many judges and writers and is beyond the scope of this discussion.
42. Lefrois v. County of Monroe, 162 N.Y. 563, 57 N.E. 185 (1900).
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owners) has so polluted the stream that liability exists. The requirements for
such liability have been discussed in the preceding note. The general rule is
that a riparian owner has the right to have a stream maintain its natural flow
through his property and this includes the right to have the water retain its
natural purity so far as possible, while permitting the upper owners to make
such reasonable use of the water as they are entitled to.1 It would appear
fruitful to begin a discussion of the relief available to a party injured by
pollution with an examination of the legal theories on which liability is based,
with the expectation that the remedies will flow clearly from the theories.
However, murky conditions exist elsewhere than in our streams, and a certain
amount of confusion exists as to exactly what are the legal grounds of an action
for pollution. If the language used by the New York courts is an indication,
the ordinary case of pollution is both a trespass, usually "continuing," and a
nuisance. It is not uncommon for the courts to refer to it as both in the same
case.2
In general, it appears that the courts usually treat pollution as a nuisance
and this seems, to the writer, to be the preferred approach. However, to
decide that nuisance is the proper theory on which to base an action for
pollution does not, by itself, provide us with a clear and established basis,
since "it was not until the publication of the Restatement of Torts in 1939 that
there was any really significant attempt to determine some definite limits to the
types of tort liability which are associated with the name." 3 The Restatement
distinguishes trespass and nuisance by the different interests, the invasion of
which gives rise to each tort. Trespass is an actionable invasion of the interest
in the exclusive possession of land, while nuisance is an invasion of the use and
enjoyment of land.4 This distinction is acquiesced in by current legal theorists. 5
The Restatement makes a further distinction, classifying as a separate tort an
interference with a riparian's interest in the use of water. 6 This classification
does not seem to have gained recognition in the cases, except as distinct
elements of damage in a pollution suit. The courts, most likely, consider any
interference with a riparian's use of water flowing through his land to be an
interference with the use of land itself. 7 The Restatement does state that the
law affords legal protection to the interest in the use of water only for a person
having property rights and privileges in the land on which the water is found.8
1. Squaw Island Freight Terminal Co. v. City of Buffalo, 273 N.Y. 119, 127, 7 N.E.2d
10, 12 (1937); 2 Farnham, Waters and Water Rights 1689 (1904).
2. See Squaw Island Freight Terminal Co. v. City of Buffalo, supra note 1; Warren
v. Parkhurst, 186 N.Y. 45, 78 N.E. 579 (1906); Sammons v. City of Gloversville, 175 N.Y.
346, 67 N.E. 622 (1903); Western New York Water Co. v. City of Niagara Falls, 91 Misc.
73, 154 N.Y. Supp. 1046 (Sup. Ct. 1915), aff'd, 226 N.Y. 671, 123 N.E. 894 (1919).
3. Prosser, Torts 389-390 (2d ed. 1955).
4. Restatement, Torts, Scope and Introductory Note to Chapter 40 at 244-245 (1939).
5. 1 Harper and James, Torts 67 (1956) ; Prosser, op. cit. supra note 3, at 409.
6. Restatement, op. cit. supra note 4, § 849.
7. 2 Farnham, op. cit. supra note 1, § 462.
8. Restatement, op. cit. supra note 4, § 849, comment 2.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Although recovery is ordinarily limited to the landowner or occupier, a guest
or member of the owner's family who is caused bodily harm by the pollution
may recover therefor; and if the nuisance arises out of negligence the rules
of liability pertaining to negligence in general apply."
One reason advanced for the confusion over what theory an action for
pollution is being based on is that in an action for an injunction, which is the
usual relief requested, the courts, in exercising their powers of equitable relief,
don't care about the legal theory on which relief is asked, as long as the case
is a proper one for the exercise of these powers. 10 The few differences that do
exist between the two theories when the claim is solely for damages will be
noted below. If pollution gives rise to an action for trespass it would seem to
be on the grounds of causing a tangible thing to enter another's premises. This
invasion will ordinarily be what the courts refer to as a "continuing trespass"
in pollution cases. However, what they really mean, at least in the case of
stream pollution, are recurring trespasses." On the other hand, a cause of
action in nuisance will arise whenever the riparians use and enjoyment of his
land is interfered with in any one of a number of ways. For example: bodily
harm may result to either humans or animals coming in contact with the water;
the water may be rendered unfit for various domestic, agricultural and indus-
trial purposes; fish and vegetation may be destroyed; and the use and enjoy-
ment of the land may be harmed by the annoyance and discomfort resulting
from the foul odors and unsightliness of a polluted stream.' 2 Of course some of
these injuries can also be recovered for as harm done incidental to a trespass, 13
but nuisance would seem to cover every situation where harm is done and if no
actual harm is done there would be no liability for a technical trespass by an
upper riparian owner since there would appear to be no unreasonable exercise
of his riparian rights. There is a major difference between the two theories in
connection with the statute of limitations. The limitation period in a trespass
action starts to run as soon as the land is entered, while in a nuisance case
it does not commence until actionable harm has occurred. However, since in
the usual pollution case the trespass is recurring, the difference is of little
practical effect in this area.14
Since nuisance is suggested herein as being the proper theory on which
to bring an action for pollution, a brief discussion of this tort may be beneficial.
As noted earlier, nuisance is characterized by the type of interest invaded.
Private nuisance 15 is defined by the Restatement as "an invasion of a person's
interest in the private use and enjoyment of land by any type of liability
9. 1 Harper and James, op. cit. supra note 5, at 88.
10. Restatement, op. cit. supra note 4, at 223.
11. Id. § 158, comment 1.
12. "Conduct which merely offends one's tastes or aesthetic sensitivity is usually not
for such reasons a nuisance." 1 Harper and James, op. cit. supra note 5, at 77.
13. Id. § 1.18.
14. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 3, at 409-410.
15. Public nuisance is distinguished at p. 491 infra.
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forming conduct. . . 2,16 Liability for nuisance can be created by conduct
which is intentional, negligent,'1 or so abnormal and out of place as to give rise
to strict liability.18 Most nuisances, particularly where pollution is concerned,
are caused by intentional conduct in the sense that the defendant usually has
knowledge of the interference with plaintiff's interests which is resulting from
his activities. However, "there are relatively few situations in which it makes
very much difference which basis of liability is to be relied on."'-9
Assuming the existence of a cause of action for pollution, on the suggested
theory of nuisance, the question arises as to what relief is available to the
plaintiff. New York Real Property Law, Section 29 provides statutory
authority for an action of nuisance and states that "a final judgment in favor
of the plaintiff, may award him damages, or direct the removal of the nuisance,
or both ... "
The most desirable remedy for the plaintiff is the "removal of the
nuisance," i.e., an injunction. Since the cause of the pollution, in the usual
case, would continue to create harm, it is the only way for the plaintiff to get
true relief. His relief will be complete since he is also entitled to be com-
pensated for damage suffered before the action.2 0 Injunction is an equitable
remedy and the courts may, and do, show great flexibility in their final judg-
ments.21 As such, the courts will not grant such relief unless certain requirements
are met. Without delving into the law of equitable remedies, those requirements,
as far as we are concerned, are the absence of an adequate remedy at law,
the existence of substantial harm producing conduct which appears to be
continuing,22 or the imminent threat of the commencement of such conduct.23
In the case of pollution these requirements are usually readily met, unless the
cause of the pollution has been terminated at the time of the action. The
action at law for damages is not adequate because the plaintiff can only re-
cover for harm suffered up to the time of the action.24 Thus he is required to
institute multiple suits in order to be fully compensated for his continuing
injury.25 The courts do not require the injury to plaintiff to be particularly
severe before they label it as substantial. This is because of the traditional
equity concept of the uniqueness of land. Anything that is a clear interference
16. Restatement, op. cit. supra note 4, at 222.
17. See p. 486 supra.
18. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 3, at 392.
19. Id. at 393.
20. Warren v. Parkhurst, supra note 2; Chapman v. City of Rochester, 110 N.Y. 273,
18 N.E. 88 (1888).
21. See, e.g., Sammons v. City of Gloversville, supra note 2; Strobel v. Kerr Salt
Co., 164 N.Y. 303, 58 N.E. 142 (1900).
22. See Anthony v. Huntley Estate of Greenburgh, 137 N.Y.S.2d 664 (Sup. Ct. 1954),
aff'd, 179 N.Y.S.2d 663 (2d Dep't 1958).
23. Mann v. Willey, 51 App. Div. 169, 64 N.Y. Supp. 589 (3d Dep't 1900), aff'd, 168
N.Y. 664, 61 N.E. 1131 (1901); Restatement, op. cit. supra note 4, § 933 comment b.
24. See infra note 49.
25. Western New York Water Co. v. City of Niagara Falls, supra note 2, at 80, 154
N.Y. Supp. at 1050.
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with the property owner's interest in his land will be a substantial injury.20
The primary restriction on the issuing of an injunction is the balancing of
interests which always takes place before the courts will exercise their equi-
table remedies. The Restatement of Torts states "the relative hardship likely
to result to the defendant if injunction is granted and to the plaintiff if it is
denied, is one of the factors to be considered in determining the appropriate-
ness of an injunction against tort.127 Thus, when the plaintiff asks for in-
junctive relief in a pollution case, there is a two-step balancing process. The
first step involves the determination of whether defendant's conduct is tor-
tious at all, i.e. whether his use of the water is unreasonable. The second
step, in respect to the appropriateness of injunctive relief, necessitates a fur-
ther and somewhat different balancing. 28 As a result, the denial of an injunc-
tion does not necessarily mean the plaintiff has no cause of action for other
relief.L2 9 In the pollution area, however, the courts, including the New York
courts, have not applied this "comparative injury" doctrine with much fervor;s°
or else they have been particularly partial to the landowner's interests. The
Court of Appeals, in Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., stated that "Al-
though the damage to the plaintiff may be slight as compared with the defend-
ant's expense of abating the condition, that is not a good reason for refusing
an injunction."3' The court, in an earlier case, had demonstrated the same
solicitous attitude, declaring that the courts ". . . will not change the law
relating to the ownership and use of property in order to accommodate a great
business enterprise.132 However, in that same case it was said ". . . the courts,
will not overlook the needs of important manufacturing interests, nor hamper
them for trifling causes . . . ."33 Subsequent lower court cases have indicated
that they were balancing the interests in denying an injunction. In Michelsen
v. Leshowicz, 34 the court quotes from two Court of Appeals cases which ap-
parently announce the "comparative injury" doctrine to be the law of the
state,35 in neither case, however, was pollution the nuisance complained of.
The issuance of an injunction in Driscoll v. American Hide and Leather Co,
would result, the court states, in ". . . nothing less than a public calamity." 30
However, there was no finding in either of these cases that a nuisance existed
at the time the action was brought.
26. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 3, at 417.
27. § 941.
28. 1 Harper and James, op. cit. supra note 5, at 90-91.
29. See Squaw Island Freight Terminal Co. v. City of Buffalo, supra note 1. Restate-
ment, op. cit. supra note 4, at 224.
30. Annot., 46 A.L.R. 8, 60 (1927).
31. 208 N.Y. 1, 5, 101 N.E. 805, 806 (1913).
32. Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., supra note 21 at 322, 58 N.E. at 147-148 (1900).
33. Ibid.
34. 55 N.Y.S.2d 831, 836 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd, 63 N.Y.S.2d 191 (2d Dep't 1946).
35. Forstmann v. Joray Holding Co., 244 N.Y. 22, 154 N.E. 652 (1926); McCann v.
Chasm Power Co., 211 N.Y. 301, 105 N.E. 416 (1914).
36. 102 Misc. 612, 620, 170 N.Y. Supp. 121, 125 (Sup. Ct. 1918), aff'd, 184 App. Div.
916, 170 N.Y. Supp. 1076 (3d Dep't 1918).
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The doctrine of prescription appears to be the reason that the require-
ments of substantial harm and comparative injury have not severely limited
the right to injunction. The rule is that "a prescriptive right may be acquired,
as against the rights of a private individual, to pollute the waters of a
stream.... ."37 The Court of Appeals, in American Knitting Co. v. Dean, held
"It seems to be well settled that in such cases, where the act com-
plained of is such that by its repetition or continuance it may become
the foundation of evidence of an adverse right, a court of equity
will interpose by injunction, though no actual damage is shown or
found."3 8
This was a case involving the diversion of water by the upper owner which
at the time caused no actual injury to the plaintiff. The law as stated by the
court would apply as well to a pollution case since a riparian owner's right to
receive the water at its natural course and level is analogous to his right to
receive it in its natural state of purity. It has been so held in subsequent
pollution cases. 39 In the case of Mann v. Willey4 ° the defendant dumped
sewage into a creek. The trial court stated that the water was thereby ren-
dered unusable by plaintiff for domestic purposes. Although plaintiff had
never used the water for domestic purposes, an injunction was granted since
she had a right to the stream in its natural purity. If the rule were other-
wise, this right would be lost if plaintiff suffered no actual harm during the
prescriptive period. Thus, in New York, the period apparently begins to run
from the time the defendant begins certain conduct, rather than from the time
such conduct becomes a nuisance.41 It would therefore seem more accurate to
say that an upper riparian may acquire by prescription the right to continue
certain conduct, rather than say he may acquire the right to maintain a pri-
vate nuisance, though the result may be the same. His use of the water must
be under claim of right; be potentially injurious to lower riparian owners, and
not be abandoned. One claiming a prescriptive right has the burden of show-
ing its existence, and if he does, it will not apply to any change in the character
of his use.42 In New York the prescriptive period is fifteen years.43 However,
the plaintiff may be barred from bringing his claim even before this period
runs if his delay constitutes laches. 44 It is no defense, in a suit for injunction,
that others are polluting the stream.45 The use that others put to the stream
37. 2 Farnham, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1706.
38. 162 N.Y. 278, 280, 56 N.E. 757 (1900).
39. Jones v. Breyer Ice Cream Co., 1 A.D.2d 253, 149 N.Y.S.2d 426 (4th Dep't 1956);
Western New York Water Co. v. City of Niagara Falls, supra note 2.
40. 51 App. Div. 169, 64 N.Y. Supp. 589 (3d Dep't 1900), aff'd, 168 N.Y. 664, 61
N.E. 1131 (1901).
41. Contra, 1 Harper and James, op. cit. supra note 5, at 88.
42. 2 Farnham, op. cit. supra note 1, § 521.
43. Klin Co. v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 271 N.Y. 376, 3 N.E.2d 516 (1936).
44. Michelsen v. Leskowicz, supra note 34; 1 Harper and James, op. cit. supra note
5, at 88.
45. 2 Farnham, op. cit. supra note 1, § 525a.
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may be relevant to the question of reasonableness, but if the stream reaches
the plaintiff in an unreasonably polluted condition, all those contributing may
be enjoined even though each individual's conduct alone would not amount to
nuisance.46
The second prominent remedy for pollution is an action for money dam-
ages. In an action in which an injunction is granted, damages may still be
assessed for harm incurred prior to the time the nuisance is enjoined. 7 And
the fact that an injunction is not granted does not mean defendant won't be held
liable for damages. This is because different considerations are involved when
the question is the existence of a nuisance, than are involved when the appro-
priateness of an injunction is being determined.48 Issues of fact in a nuisance
action will be tried by a jury, but there is no jury when an injunction is re-
quested.48a
The remedy of money damages is less desirable than an injunction be-
cause it gives only temporary relief, i.e., compensation for harm already suf-
fered. While an injunction may be granted for threatened harm, damages can
only be recovered for harm which has been suffered and proved by the plain-
tiff.49 If the defendant continues to pollute the water, it constitutes a new
nuisance. However, if the nuisance can not be abated or is such that the courts
will not enjoin, all damages may be obtained in one action."0 Otherwise suc-
cessive suits will be required to recover for the future damage. In cases where
more than one person causes the pollution, the courts will make an apportion-
ment of the damages if possible, and each contributor will only be liable for
the proportionate share of the harm that he caused.r' As discussed previously,
the rule is different when the claim is for an injunction, the court looking at
the total effect of the concurring causes in reaching its decision. 2 When the
action is for money damages it again makes little difference whether it is based
on trespass or nuisance. While the rule is that nominal damage may be recov-
ered for a technical trespass and not for a nuisance,53 this is not much of a
distinction in the pollution area, since an invasion of plaintiff's interest in
land via a polluted stream is privileged if reasonable, by the doctrine of ripar-
ian rights. The one situation in which it might make a difference is where
defendant's conduct is unreasonable but has not yet caused injury. Though
an injunction may be gotten in such a case on a nuisance theory, nominal
46. Warren v. Parkhurst, supra note 2; Chipman v. Palmer, 77 N.Y. 51 (1879);
Prosser, op. cit. supra note 3, at 422.
47. Chapman v. City of Rochester, supra note 20; Warren v. Parkhurst, supra note 2.
48. Restatement, op. cit. supra note 4, at 224.
48a. Cogswell v. N.Y., N.H., and H. Railroad Co., 105 N.Y. 319, 11 N.E. 518 (1887).
49. Ibid.; 2 Farnham, op. cit. supra note 1, § 527. However, threatened injury may
amount to present harm by interfering with enjoyment, as well as the value, of the land.
go. 1 Harper and James, op. cit. supra note 5, at 91; Prosser, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 410.
51. Sammons v. City of Gloversville, supra note 2; Chipman v. Palmer, supra note 46.
52. See p. 476 supra.
53. 13 N.Y. Jur., Damages § 7 (1960).
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damages would not be recoverable unless trespass was the basis.M On the
other hand, damages for trespass will include liability for any incidental inter-
ference with the owner's use and enjoyment of his land.
Once the right to money damages in an action for pollution has been
established there remains the question of what factors will be considered in
computing the damages. Since the usual claim is for temporary injury-the
harm suffered by plaintiff up to the time of the action-to the land, the meas-
ure of damages is the decrease in its rental value for that period.5 5 If, how-
ever, the condition is permanent or irreparable, the decrease in the market
value of the property caused by the pollution will constitute the damage.5 6
The plaintiff's recovery is not limited to the injury suffered by him because of
the decrease in the value of his land. Since the basis of a nuisance action is
that the landowner's use and enjoyment of his land is being interfered with,
invasion of this personal right of plaintiff's will be compensated for. Defendant
will also be liable for any special damage caused, e.g., illness caused the land-
owner by the polluted water,57 the death of his cattle58 or interference with
his business. 9
A third remedy available is that of self-help, i.e., abatement.60 A person
who is harmed by a private nuisance has a privilege to go upon the land of the
person causing the nuisance and abate it by the use of reasonable force. This
right is limited by the rule that it must be exercised within a reasonable time
after knowledge of the nuisance is acquired and if the delay is such that legal
process could have been resorted to, the privilege will be lost. It is questionable,
then, if this relief would be permitted in a pollution case where the harm is
usually caused by a gradual process which builds up over a period of time.
Another limitation is that the offender must first be requested to abate the
nuisance himself, unless this request would be useless or an emergency situation
exists.61 The party seeking to abate the nuisance must act in a reasonable manner
at all times.
An act or ommission which obstructs or causes inconvenience or damage
to the public in the exercise of rights common to all is a public nuisance.62
Since the scope of this note is limited to private remedies, nuisance, when here-
tofore referred to, has meant "private" nuisance. When the nuisance qualifies
as a "public" one, a private person may exercise remedies herein discussed if
54. See p. 490 supra.
55. 13 N.Y. Jur., op. cit. supra note 53 § 88; Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 256, 271 (1956).
56. 1 Harper and James, op. cit. supra note 5, at 92; Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 256, 260
(1956).
57. Chapman v. City of Rochester, supra note 20.
58. Driscoll v. American Hide and Leather Co., supra note 36.
59. Forbes v. City of Jamestown, 212 App. Div. 332, 209 N.Y. Supp. 99 (4th Dep't
1925).
60. Restatement, op. cit. supra note 4, § 201; Prosser, op. cit. supra note 3, at 419,
420; 1 Harper and James, op. cit. supra note 5, § 1.18.
61. Childers v. New York Power and Light Corp., 275 App. Div. 133, 89 N.Y.S.2d 11
(3d Dep't 1949).
62. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 3, at 401.
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he suffers some special damage, distinct from that common to the public.0 3 This
is to be distinguished from the situation where defendant's conduct creates both
a public and a private nuisance.64 Just because the pollution of a stream injures
a number of riparian owners along its course does not make it a public nuisance.
It may become one if public fishing or swimming rights are affected or a public
drinking supply is contaminated. 5 There is, in effect, however, a "private"
remedy for a public nuisance. A public nuisance is a crime for which the offender
can be prosecuted. 6  Thus by acting as the complainant in a criminal action, a
riparian owner may be able to get effective relief from the pollution.
This survey of the common law remedies for pollution indicates that a
riparian owner has been provided with the legal tools to prevent the pollution
of a stream running through his land. And yet, the polluted condition of the
streams in New York State has worsened continuously to the point where, in
most cases, an injured riparian owner would have to sue a multitude of de-
fendants before any effective lessening of pollution could be accomplished.
Today, then, the situation is virtually hopeless from the viewpoint of the com-
mon-law remedies except in the cases of the smaller streams and where one or
two minor sources are causing particular damage to the plaintiff. Hope for
relief has now been left for all practical purposes in the hands of the state. 7
Why has this situation developed? One writer has suggested the lack of
diligence by riparian owners in pursuing their remedies along with the limita-
tions on those remedies, particularly the right to injunction. 8 Despite the
broad language used in some of the cases, it can safely be assumed that the
courts recognize the needs of industry and the increasing importance to the
general welfare of the state in not overly handicapping it. An even greater
consideration may be the fact that the average riparian owner does not use the
water today for the many purposes that he did in the last century. It does not
seem probable today that a source of pollution would be enjoined when there is
no harm to plaintiff because he might in the future want to use the water for
domestic purposes.69 On the other hand, modern science has provided methods
for the upper riparian to correct his source of pollution.
In general it appears the battle to control pollution by common-law remedies
has been lost. The gradual build up of prescriptive rights, the fact that each
upper riparian may put his stream to a reasonable use even though this includes
a certain amount of pollution, and the inaction of riparian owners (who alone
can invoke these remedies) to exercise their rights, have been determinative in
delegating pollution correction to governmental authorities.
63. Francis v. Schoellkopf, 53 N.Y. 152 (1873); Prosser, op. cit. supra note 3, at 401.
64. Restatement, op. cit. supra note 4, at 217.
65. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 3, at 402.
66. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 1530-1532; N.Y. Conservation Law § 387 (1) (d).
67. See the following article, infra note 68.
68. Note, 35 Va. L. Rev. 774 (1949).
69. See Mann v. Willey, supra note 40.
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NEW YORK STATE MACHINERY FOR THE ABATEMENT AND
CONTROL OF WATER POLLUTION
"Health, safety and the availability of pure water for home, recreational
and industrial use are matters of great concern relating to adequate sewage
facilities."' Water pollution continues to be a serious problem in New York
State with its growing population and increased industrialization.
The job of water pollution control which confronted the New York
Legislature was not an easy one. Conditions varied considerably in the
different waters throughout the state and even in different segments of the
same waters. As a result of this, the problem and its solution had to be
approached in fairly general fashion.
After years of careful and detailed study of the problem of water
pollution and its abatement, the Legislature, in 1949, enacted the Water
Pollution Control Law. The Act, designed to prevent pollution of the waters
of the state, created the Water Pollution Control Board and directed it to
develop a comprehensive program for the abatement and control of such
pollution.la
The public policy as announced in the water pollution control law is
to maintain reasonable standards of purity of the waters of the state, con-
sistent with public health, public enjoyment of waters, propagation and
protection of fish and wild life, and the industrial development of the state.2
The law has two purposes: 3 (1) to prevent new pollution; and (2) to
bring about the abatement of pollution from sources which were in existence
at the time the law was enacted, and under a program consistent with the
above declaration of policy. It is the function. of the Water Pollution Control
Board to administer and carry out the provisions of the law.
The Board consists of the heads of five departments of the State
government, namely, the commissioners of the departments of health, con-
servation, agriculture and markets, commerce, and the superintendent of the
1. N.Y. Sess. Law News-184th Session, Annual Message of the Governor to the
Legislature, vol. 1, p. A-3.
la. Shortly after this writing was completed, the N.Y. Legislature abolished the
Water Pollution Control Board and created the Water Resources Commission. N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1961, ch. 490. The law transfers the functions of the Water Pollution Control Board
to the Water Resources Commission and the State Department of Health. The classification
of waters and adoption of standards of quality and purity will now be a function of
the Water Resources Commission. The law leaves the presently established classifications
undisturbed, and approves subject to modification, the system and plan of classification,
and the standards of quality and purity adopted by the Water Pollution Control Board.
The law broadens the outlook of the Water Resources Commission by adding the
Commissioner of Commerce as a regular member and representatives of industry, agricul-
ture, sportsmen and municipalities as advisory members. However, the general scheme or
concept of the control of water pollution is not changed by the new law.
2. N.Y. Public Health Law § 1200.
3. N.Y. Public Health Law § 1201.
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department of public works.4 The Commissioner of Health or his depart-
mental designee is the chairman of the Board.
In carrying out its function of abating and preventing pollution of
waters, the Board has power to: adopt classifications of water; hold public
hearings and compel the attendance of witnesses; make findings of fact and
determinations; and assess penalties with respect to violations of the provisions
of the Water Pollution Act or the orders issued by the Board; make, modify,
or cancel orders requiring the discontinuance of the discharge of sewage,
industrial waste and specifying the conditions and the time within which
such discontinuance must be accomplished; institute proceedings in a court
of competent jurisdiction to compel compliance with the provisions of the
Act or the determinations and orders of the Board; issue, modify, or deny
permits for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste or other wastes, or for
the installation or operation of disposal systems or parts thereof; continue,
revoke or modify any permit issued before or after the Act whenever, after
a hearing, the Board determines that such continuation, revocation or modi-
fication is necessary or desirable to prevent or abate pollution of any waters
of the state; perform such other and further acts as may be necessary, proper
or desirable, to effectively carry out the duties and responsibilities of the
Board.6
Formal standards are set out in the Act itself with regard to the manner
in which the above powers and duties of the Board are to be carried out so
as to prevent any arbitrary actions on the part of the Board in attempting
to reach its goal of eliminating unreasonable pollution of the waters of the
state.7 . In addition to this, all orders or determinations of the Board are
subject to review by means of a proceeding under Article 78 of the Civil
Practice Act or by petition of any person aggrieved.8 The Act also sets out
the various penalties to be imposed for violation of the provisions of the
Act or orders of the Board.9
The bases for proceedings or actions resulting from the violations of the
prohibitions contained in the Act inure solely to the State of New York and
the Act in no way creates new, or enlarges existing, rights of riparian
owners or others.10
AcTuAL OPERATION OF THE BOARD
With regard to new sources of pollution, that is, new outlets constructed
after the effective date of the Act, or significant modifications of old disposal
systems, approval of plans and a written permit for construction and operation
4. N.Y. Public Health Law § 1205(2).
S. N.Y. Public Health Law § 1206(1).
6. N.Y. Public Health Law § 1208(3a-i).
7. See N.Y. Public Health Law §§ 1209, 1224, 1240, 1241, 1242, 1243.
8. N.Y. Public Health Law § 1244(1)(2a).
9. See N.Y. Public Health Law §§ 1250-1252.
10. N.Y. Public Health Law § 1261.
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are required from the Water Pollution Control Board. This requirement
applies regardless of whether waters have been classified or not. The Board,
in considering plans for approval, requires that certain established standards
be met. The decisions of the Board are nevertheless based on reasonableness,
so as not to unreasonably stifle new developments. An example of the Board's
operation as to new pollution would be as follows:
A development to serve 1000 homes. At the start, only 500 homes are
to be constructed. Stream requirements might be such that a sewer system
providing only primary treatment would be sufficient for 500 homes, whereas
future requirements for 1000 homes would necessitate secondary treatment.
Under such circumstances the Board would require that the plans show all
necessary provisions for secondary treatment, but would give permission to
construct initially only the facilities for primary treatment and then require
construction of the secondary facilities when construction starts on the
additional 500 homes of the development.-'
With regard to dealing with old sources of pollution, the Act sets forth a
series of procedures to be followed by the Board in making its determinations.12
A basic requirement is that before the Board acquires any legal authority
to require abatement of pollution from so-called old outlets, the receiving
waters must be classified by the Board.13 In making such classifications,
many factors are to be considered, but the main requirement or test is the
"best usage in the public interest" principle.' 4 Some of the other factors
considered are hydrologic considerations, present and foreseeable future bor-
dering land usages, present and foreseeable future water usages, and the
extent of existing defilement caused by existing pollutional discharges.15 As
of now, the Board is in the process of classifying all the waters throughout
the state.
A definite procedure, consisting of four steps, is followed by the Board
in classifying the waters.
First, a survey is made of the basin to be classified to obtain the basic
data and information needed in connection with consideration of the classes
which are to be assigned to the various waters within the basin.
The second step then involves the preparation and publication of a
report to serve as a basis for a public hearing before the classifications are
adopted. All parties of interest are given full opportunity to be heard at
these meetings.
The third step consists of the public hearing itself.
Finally, the Board, after making any adjustments it deems proper as a
11. See Progress Report of the Temporary State Commission on Water Resources
Planning-1960-Workshop VIII-Water Pollution Control Problems and Practices.
12. N.Y. Public Health Law §§ 1209, 1242, 1243.
13. N.Y. Public Health Law § 1208.
14. N.Y. Public Health Law § 1209(2).
15. N.Y. Public Health Law § 1209(1-5).
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result of the public hearing, adopts the classifications it has made and files
them with the Secretary of State.16
When the above steps have been completed, the Board is then in a
legal position to proceed with the development of its plan for abatement and
the enforcement of such plan. The desired procedure is that of voluntary
cooperation between the Board and those guilty of polluting. When this
cannot be achieved, the Board, as stated earlier, has power to institute court
proceedings through the Attorney General to force compliance. Unfortunately,
it appears that this method or procedure will be the rule rather than the
exception on the basis of three recent cases involving the classification of
certain waters within the state by the Board. However, it must be said that
one benefit was achieved by this litigation, namely, the constitutionality of
the Act was tested and upheld.
City of Utica v. Water Pollution Control Board17
Acting under the authority of the Water Pollution Control Law, the
Water Pollution Control Board held public hearings and in 1950 adopted
classifications and standards of quality and purity. Then in 1954, following
extensive studies and surveys, and after further public hearings it assigned
classifications and standards of quality and purity to the waters within the
Utica area. Some months later, in March of 1955, the Board submitted a
pollution abatement plan to the City of Utica. It was noted in that plan
that sewers were discharging untreated sewage from the city into the Mohawk
River and the Barge Canal and the suggestion was made that the city should
proceed with the completion or revision of final plans, approved six years
before, for a proposed sewage treatment plant. When, however, two more
years went by and nothing was done to abate the pollution caused by the
sewage discharge complained of, the Board brought a proceeding against
the city charging it with violations of Section 1220 of the Public Health Law.
The city thereupon instituted an Article 78 proceeding in the nature of
a writ of prohibition,'8 to restrain the Board from continuing with the hearing
of charges against it upon the ground that the Water Pollution Control Law
was unconstitutional. The court at Special Term19 dismissed the petition and
the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed.20  On appeal, the court of
Appeals affirmed with one Judge dissenting.2 '
The city contended that the Water Pollution Control Law constituted an
invalid delegation of legislative authority, a grant of power without adequate
16. N.Y. Public Health Law § 1209(1-8).
17. 5 N.Y.2d 164, 182 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1959).
18. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1283.
19. Sup. Ct. - Special Term (Albany County 1958).
20. 6 A.D.2d 340, 177 N.Y.S.2d 47 (3d Dep't 1958).
21. Supra note 17.
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standards for the Board's guidance in violation of Article III, Section 1 of
the New York State Constitution.
In rejecting this argument, the court stated:
Having clearly expressed the policy underlying the law, the Legis-
lature was privileged to leave to the Board the power to decide what
properties indicate a polluted condition of a particular class of waters
and to assign the appropriate classification to any water of the state.
Such a power is no more than one to make subordinate rules and
determine the facts to which the legislative policy is to apply. In
other words, the Legislature is not required to break its plan down
into fine detail in order to carry through its purpose of safeguarding
the waters of the state.
22
The legislature provided the manner in which the Board was to act and
the matters to be considered-e.g., the physical factors actually listed as
well as factors familiar to the science of environmental sanitation, pollution
abatement, and public health. Because of this, the statute may not be
stricken as an invalid delegation of legislative power.
Town of Waterford v. Water Pollution Control Board23
In 1950, the Board classified a section of the Mohawk River bordering
on the Town and Village of, Waterford as class C water. As a result of such
classification, the town, which for a long period of time had been discharging
sewage into the river without any kind of treatment, was required to cease
such practice and eventually to construct sewage treatment facilities.
The town thereby instituted an Article 78 proceeding challenging the
right of the Board to classify the waters of that section of the Mohawk River
as class C water.
Special Term24 transferred the case to the Appellate Division which con-
firmed the determination of the Board,2 5 which confirmation was appealed to
the Court of Appeals.
The major contention of the town was that the Board failed to comply
with Section 1209 of the Public Health Law in that it failed to give any
consideration to the fiscal and economic aspects of its classification and as a
result of this, the classification should be set aside.
The court held that the Board was not required to consider probable
costs or relative priorities as between municipal public works projects at the
time it adopts the classification for particular waters and that it was premature
for the town to raise fiscal considerations at the time of such classification.
Classification made by the Board only had to be in accordance with consider-
ations of best usage in the interest of the public and that nowhere in Section
22. Supra note 17 at 171, 182 N.Y.S.2d at 589 (1959).
23. 5 N.Y.2d 171, 182 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1959).
24. Sup. Ct. - Special Term (Albany County 1957).
25. 4 A.D.2d 415, 164 N.Y.S.2d 914 (3d Dep't 1957).
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1209, which sets out the criteria to govern a particular classification, is the
Board compelled to consider financial costs, fiscal conditions, or public works
priorities. At the stage of classifying waters, the Board is merely applying its
overall system of water classifications and quality standards to a particular body
of water, in accordance with "best usage" of that water and in the light of
hydrologic factors, the character of the surrounding district, the past, present,
and foreseeable uses of such waters and the extent of present pollution.
The proper time to consider the financial ability of affected municipali-
ties to comply with established standards is when the Board, in accordance
with its previously assigned classifications, evolves a comprehensive program
to abate pollution in the classified waters. If at that time a municipality
demonstrates that it is financially unable to provide the treatment works
necessary to cure existing pollution, the Board is empowered to grant exten-
sions of time.
The Legislature well knew that a comprehensive water purification plan
would impose a financial burden upon the municipalities of the state, but
determined, by enacting the Pollution Control Act, that the pressing need for
water purification outweighed any financial hardships.
City of Johnstown v. Water Pollution Control Board20
The city brought an Article 78 proceeding to review an order of the
Board requiring the discontinuance of the use of Cayadutta Creek for the
discharge of untreated sewage and to have such order declared void and
unenforceable against the city. The Board claimed the city violated Section
1220 of the Public Health Law and that the discharging of the untreated
sewage constituted a public nuisance 2  In addition to the order of discon-
tinuance, the Board directed the city to arrange for the construction of a
sewage treatment works and disposal system and to place it in operation to
eliminate the unlawful pollution of the creek.
The city argued that the Board had no power to classify Cayadutta
Creek because it is a non-navigable stream, the title of which is in private
riparian owners and that the power of the Board to classify is limited to
"waters of the state." But the court held that under Section 1202 of the
Water Pollution Control Act, "waters of the state" include all fresh water
in streams, public or private.
The city also objected to the order on the reasoning that it may not
be able to raise the necessary money to execute a program for a sewage
treatment works within the time fixed by the order.
The court dismissed this by stating that even if such contingency might
occur, it did not require that the order itself be annulled. The city would
26. - A.D.2d -, 209 N.Y.S.2d 982 (3d Dep't 1961).
27. See N.Y. Penal Law § 1530(1).
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have an opportunity to appy to the Board on a proper showing for an exten-
sion of time to comply with the order.28 Thus, the order was affirmed.
The three above cases are evidence of the major and most difficult
problem that the Board and the whole concept of abating pollution will be
faced with, that is, one of financing. Municipalities are resistant because of
the high costs of providing remedial works and increased financial burden
which would be added to an already high tax burden. So long as this resistance
continues, and it is fairly safe to assume that it will, the state's water
pollution control program will be seriously impeded.
How is this resistance to be overcome? What can be done if a munici-
pality absolutely refuses to comply with an order of the Board ordering
abatement of pollution? True, legal action can be taken as the previously
mentioned cases point out. But what if a city wishes to take steps in
abating pollution and seeks to finance the project by a bond issue and the
voters turn it down? How then is the state to proceed with enforcement of
a pollution abatement order? One suggestion has been some form of state
aid. But this raises the question: "Why should residents of municipalities
which have built treatment plants, be required to help pay to construct
facilities for other municipalities which do not have treatment plants?"
In all probability, the only effective means, which is by no means the
most desirable, will have to be that of judicial proceedings in each and every
case. This involves added time and money which thus creates another
problem in and of itself. But if the objective sought is to be achieved, such
procedure will have to be followed.
INTERNATIONAL AND FEDERAL CONTROL OF WATER POLLUTION
The control of water pollution is better understood if one has an
appreciation of what water pollution is, and the effects upon users of a
polluted body of water.
Pollution in the Niagara River between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario is
largely a result of domestic sewage and industrial wastes.1 These wastes
reach the Niagara River through municipal sewage systems or are discharged
directly into the river by industrial outlets. In the early part of the century
the primary sources of pollution were the bacteria and organic chemicals found
in domestic sewage discharged by the municipalities into the boundary waters
of the United States and Canada. These waters consist of the Niagara
River and sections of Lake Erie and Ontario. The pollution of the Niagara
River above the Falls is, according to a study made by the International
28. N.Y. Public Health Law § 1224.
1. Report of the International Joint Commission; United States and Canada on the
Pollution of Boundary Waters, 299 (1951).
2. Id. at 261.
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Joint Commission in 1948 and 1949, a result of both domestic sewage and
industrial waste.3
The answer to the question of what water pollution is and how it affects
water users involves an excursion into a highly technical area of the sanitary
engineer and can only be fully understood by those conversant with chemistry
and related sciences. This discussion will avoid delving into this technical
labyrinth in detail and be content with a most general explanation of pollution
and its ramifications.
Pollution effects on water quality are measured by bacteriological,
chemical and physical examinations. (1) The coliform group of bacteria in-
habit the intestines of warm blooded animals and are found in large numbers
in human feces. Raw domestic sewage may carry many millions of such
coliform bacteria per 100 milliliters. (2) Phenolic compounds give a taste
and odor to water which is described as medicinal. They are an organic
compound found in industrial waste. They taint fish and in high concentrations
are toxic to fish. Water does not normally contain phenolic compounds.
(3) Ammonion ion tends to combine with chlorine to form chloramines in
the water supply which increases the demand for chlorine. They are also
toxic to fish in sufficiently high concentrations. (4) All water contains dis-
solved oxygen. It has an optimum oxygen saturation point for each tempera-
ture. When this saturation point is lowered this indicates there are polluting
organic substances which are absorbing the oxygen out of the water., A
significant reduction in dissolved oxygen causes offensive odors and suffoca-
tion of fish. (5) Other concentrations included Hydrogen ion, alkalincity,
oils and other ether-extractable materials and cyanides. Of these pollutants
the most significant by far, as far as over all water pollution is concerned,
are the coliform bacteria (from sewage) and phenols (mostly from industrial
waste) .4
The major areas of high pollution in the Niagara River are along Black
Rock Canal, the Buffalo River, the Channel running along the east side of
Grand Island and the United States side of the Niagara just above the Falls.5
This pollution has significant consequences for the industrial and domestic
uses to which the water is put. The domestic uses of the water are seriously
impaired and great efforts and expense must be expended to purify and
chlorinate it before it is fit for human consumption. The industrial uses of
the water are greatly reduced if it has high phenol concentrations for these
concentrations impair the purifying properties of water and make it unfit for
most industrial uses. Also, the discharging of uneven amounts of industrial
waste cause what is known as slugs of pollution which enter water purification
plants before they have a chance to increase the chlorine treatment to handle
3. Id. at 262.
4. Supra notes 2 and 3.
5. Supra note 1.
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this increased pollution and hence are an additional health hazard. The
International Joint Commission concluded after an eighteen month study that
"The Upper Niagara River receives the heaviest concentration of coliform
organisms in the Lake Erie-Lake Ontario Section. As a consequence the
quality of the water at many places is unsuitable as a source for potable
water supply even when treated by modern purification methods . .- * The
presence of sewage pollution in bathing areas constitutes a health hazard.
Public bathing facilities are located on the Canadian side of Lake Erie and
at the upstream end of Grand Island. Elsewhere, bathing is not extensive
as pollution has tended to interfere with the development of suitable areas ...
Industrial wastes containing cyanides, phenols, chlorine, and copper and iron
salts have been implicated in causing many of the fish kills of the upper
river. Oil pollution has at times caused widespread destruction of birds in
these areas . . . The scenic resources afforded by both the Falls and the
Niagara River are of considerable importance to the economics of the Niagara
Frontier area. The promiscuous discharge of such deleterious materials as
refuse, oils, or other obnoxious wastes would greatly detract from the appear-
ance of these boundary waters."
The Boundary Waters between the United States and Canada in -the
Western New York area, i.e., Lake Erie, Niagara River and Lake Ontario,
come within the provisions of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 between
United States and Great Britain.8 Article IV of the Boundary Waters Treaty
specifically enjoins a duty upon the High Contracting Parties to see that
pollutants are not discharged into boundary waters by one to the injury of the
other. The Article states, "It is further agreed that the waters herein defined
as boundary waters and waters flowing across the boundary shall not be
polluted on either side to the injury of health or property on the other." 7 The
Treaty created the International Joint Commission composed of Canadian
and American representatives who had power to investigate, arbitrate disputes
and approve water diversions and obstrudtions previously approved by the
individual governmental authorities.8 The International Joint Commission
has accomplished two investigations into the cause, extent and ramifications of
pollution in the boundary waters subject to the Treaty on the mutual request
of the High Contracting Parties.9 The investigations, one beginning in 1913 to
1916 and the other from 1946 to 1949, made extensive surveys, and reported
a considerable extent of pollution with specific recommendations which were
not binding upon either country. The International Joint Commission both
in 1916 and 1951 made unanimous recommendations to the United States
6. 36 Stat. 2448, 2451 (1909).
7. Boundary Waters Treaty Between United States and Great Britain Art. LV (1909).
8. Boundary Waters Treaty Between United States and Great Britain, 36 Stat.
2449-2450 (1909).
9. Supra note 1 at 221.
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and Canada on how to remedy the serious pollution situation existing in the
boundary waters.'0
The International Joint Commission has no administrative machinery for
implementing its recommendations on pollution control nor does it have the
authority to require the United States and Canadian Governments to imple-
ment them. They are simply non-compulsory advice."
The Canadian Government has not raised an issue with the United States
over pollution of boundary waters even through U. S. industry and to a less
extent municipalities dump by far the greatest amount of pollutive wastes and
sewages into the boundary waters. The reason for this, however, is not due
to the Job-like patience of the Canadian authorities. No, the cause of
the Canadian forbearance must be assigned to the fact that the major effects
of United States polluting are confined to the United States sector of the bound-
ary waters.' 2 This fact is stated very succinctly in the antiseptic language of
the Report of the International Joint Commission; United States and Canada
on the Pollution of Boundary Waters thus, "In Lake Erie, the general trend
of both coliform and phenol results indicates that major pollution is normally
confined to a relatively narrow path along the United States Shore. However,
certain high phenol results along the Canadian shore, together with the move-
ment of a number of floats from either side to the other, suggest that trans
boundary currents may prevail during periods of abnormal meteorological con-
ditions," and again, "The spread of pollution across the boundary in the upper
Niagara River is restricted by the high velocity of flow. The analytical results
indicate that normally the pollution zone along the eastern shore is confined
within United States waters and consequently to the East Channel of the river
.. Ice jams along the river and strong winds may alter normal flow conditions
but. there is no record of the West Channel of the river (along the Canadian
shore) being affected by the polluted zone along the United States shore. This
is substantiated by the analytical results."' 3 It is clear that the Canadian
government is not going to be too concerned over the fact of Americans polluting
water used by other Americans and even if they did the United States would
take offense at foreign interference with its sovereign right to pollute water
used by its own people. It is equally clear that Niagara residents must look
to their own government for any alleviation from the industrial and municipal
pollutants.
FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL
The Federal Government has three statutes which deal with pollution of
navigable waters, none of which, in all objective reality, deal with the prob-
lem. The jurisdictional basis of the Federal Government to control water pollu-
10. Ibid.
11. Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 Art. IX. (1909).
12. Supra note 1 at 222.
13. Supra note 1 at 290, 292.
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fion will not be discussed as it is fully treated in one of the lead articles con-
tained in this volume.14 Suffice it to say that Federal Control on the Niagara
River could be based on the Commerce Clause, Admiralty jurisdiction and the
Treaty Power.
The earliest statute dealing with water pollution was contained in the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 amending an earlier act passed in 1890.15 The
section generally prohibits the discharge of waste of any kind into the navigable
waters of the United States, excepting waste which flows from streets and
sewers and passes into the navigable waters of the United States, or tributaries
of navigable waters, in a liquid state. But the section only applies if such dis-
charges of waste impedes or hinders navigation. The Section also gives authority
to the Secretary of the Army to allow such deposits or discharges on conditions
laid down by him. The two keys to this section are that the waste or refuse
must be dumped into a navigable water of the United States and it must im-
pede navigation in order for the section to apply. The second requirement
renders the act ineffectual as far as water pollution control is concerned for it
is hard to imagine how many of the most dangerous pollutants, both industrial
and municipal, could impede navigation, as they are in most instances micro-
scopic in size. Large batches of garbage and trash which could conceivably
hinder navigation, do not figure in as a serious pollution menace. The only dis;"
charges which have been held by the courts to be prohibited under this section
are blotches of crude oil either from ships or industrial plants.' 6 The theory in
prohibiting oil discharges into navigable waters is that they represent a fire
hazard to ships and encrust their hulls, thus impeding navigation. The Oper-
ations Head of the Corps of Engineers in Buffalo, who has charge of seeing
that this Section is enforced, stated that, except for the surface oils, the Corps
plays no part in the control of water pollution on the Niagara River and adja-
cent waters.
It must be concluded that if Section 407 of the River and Harbors Act
was ever intended to play a role in water pollution abatement it has not been
interpreted by the courts in order to effectuate this purpose and is almost no
deterrent to industrial pollution. In fact, until 1960,17 the authorities seem to
hold that the meager polluting wastes that the statute did proscribe could not
be stopped by injunction,' 8 the only sanction being a maximum fine of $2,500
and minimum of $500.19
There was an oil pollution act passed in 1924 which prohibited ships from
dumping excess oil into coastal waters,20 but this act only applied to coastal
14. Trelease, Federal Jurisdiction Over Water in the Eastern United States, 10
Buffalo L. Rev. 399 (1961).
15. 30 Stat. 1152 (1899), 33 U.S.C. 407 (1952).
16. United States v. Ballard Oil Co. of Hartford, 195 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1952).
17. United States Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960).
18. United States v. Bigan, 274 F.2d 729 (3rd Cir. 1960).
19. Supra note 15 at § 411.
20. 43 Stat. 604 (1924), 33 U.S.C. 431-436 (1952).
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waters where the tide ebbs and flows, so, it is not germane to this discussion
of pollution in the Niagara River area.
The first federal act to realistically address itself to the ever more
serious pollution of the countries water resources was the Federal Pollution
Control Act of 194821
The Act begins by stating its allegiance to the principle that the states are
primarily responsible for water pollution controL2 2 It goes on to provide for
cooperation between the Surgeon General and state and local agencies in for-
mulating programs for water pollution control.2 3 The next Section allows inter-
state compacts for pollution control between states parties to the compact;
such compacts needing Congressional approval before becoming effective.24
The Surgeon General is given authority to render assistance to other Federal,
State and local agencies in combatting pollution, to make investigations upon
the requests of a state into pollution problems and to establish research fellow-
ship in the Public Health Service. 2 5 Other sections provide for grants in aid,
not to exceed $3,000,000 a year, for pollution control programs, such grants
based on the per capita income of the state as compared to the per capita in-
come of United States; poorer states receiving the largest grants. 2 0 The pollu-
tion control plans for which the grants are given must be approved by the
Surgeon General before any monies are extended. 27 There is a special provi-
sion for grants to states and municipalities for the construction of sewage
treatment works if such projects are approved by the Surgeon General in
advance. Grants under this section are of most importance and the total
amount authorized is $500,000,000 but not to exceed $50,000,000 in any
fiscal year. The allocation formula is substantially the same as the one used
for grants for water pollution control programs. 28
The-most important sections of the Water Pollution Control Act are the
two which deal with Federal authority to enforce measures to abate water pol-
lution. Section 466g sets up an advisory board composed of the Surgeon Gen-
eral or a Sanitary engineer and nine members appointed by the President
from outside of the federal government. The nine board members have three
year terms and are to advise the Surgeon General on policy matters relative
to the objectives of the Water Pollution Control Act.29
Section 466g is the real heart of the Act, for it grants to the Federal Gov-
ernment the authority to abate pollution in waters which flow between states
and along state borders, on the complaint of a state, other than the state where
21. 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) as amended, 33 U.S.C. 466 et seq. (1952).
22. 33 U.S.C. 466 (1952).
23. 33 U.S.C. 466a (1952).
24. 33 U.S.C. 466b (1952).
25. 33 U.S.C. 466c (1952).
26. 33 U.S.C. 466d (1952).
27. 33 U.S.C. 466d (1952).
28. 33 U.S.C. 466e (1952).
29. 33 U.S.C. 466f (1952).
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the pollution originates, if the pollution endangers the health or welfare of the
non-polluting state.30 Section 466g (b) states, in essence, that state and in-
terstate action should be used to the utmost, and that the "Federal Power"
should be looked to only as a last resort.
Elaborate, and rather cumbersome procedure, must be complied with
before federal enforcement is brought into play. The Surgeon General,
from his own surveys, or on the request of a state, shall call a con-
ference of the state responsible for the polluting and the state or states affected
by such pollution by giving all parties concerned three weeks notice. After the
conference the Surgeon General must send a summary of the conference to all
those who attended it, concerning the nature of the pollution, measures taken
to abate it, and any delays entailed in abating the pollution.31 If no action is
taken by the state where the pollution originates, then the Surgeon General
may recommend to such state that it begin remedial action and such state must
be given at least six months to begin pollution abatement.32 If the polluting.
state still does not make adequate progress toward alleviating the pollution
then the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare steps into the picture.
The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare shall then call a public
hearing at the place where the pollution originates before a board picked by
him. The board shall be composed of one member selected by the polluting
state, one selected by the states or 'state being polluted and one member from
the Department of Commerce. The board must be composed of at least five
members, a majority of whom are not members of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare. If the Board finds that pollution, as defined by Sub-
section (A), exists, and substantial progress to alleviate it is not being made,
then it shall make recommendations to the Secretary on how to abate it. The
Secretary then sends a notice to the polluters to abaie the pollution, giving
them at least six months to accomplish same. The state agencies involved will
also be notified of the findings and the action taken.33
Finally, if after all this, the polluter continues to stand firm against the
onslaught of the "Federal Power," the Secretary may request the Attorney
General to bring suit to abate the pollution, "If", he gets the written consent
of either the state where the pollution originates, or the state where the waters
are being polluted.3 4
As a final means of strengthening rational and coherent enforcement of a
federal pollution control law, the Court where the case is tried may consider
whether it is economically feasible to abate the pollution, even if it is proved
beyond peradventure.35
30. 33 U.S.C. 466g (1952).
31. 33 U.S.C. 466g(c) (2) and (3) (1952).
32. 33 U.S.C. 466g(d) (1952).
33. 33 U.S.C. 466g(e) (1952).
34. 33 U.S.C. 466g(f) (1952).
35. 33 U.S.C. 466g(g) (1952).
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The enforcement provision of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
have been used only once, in September, 1960, since the enforcement pro-
visions were put into the act.3 6 The reason for the failure to use the enforce-
ment procedure of the act does not stem from the fact that pollution is not a
serious problem in the United States. Although, the harmful effects of
municipal sewerage has been greatly reduced in late years by a significant
increase in the number and quality of treatment plants, this improvement
has been in a great part negated by the alarming increase in industrial pollu-
tion. Experts estimate that industry dumps twice as much pollution waste
into United States water than do municipalities.8 7 Some writers assert that
only the federal government is in a position to clean up the waters because
large industries exert too much pressure upon state agencies, which in turn
are reluctant to exert pressure on such industries for fear they will pull up
and move to a state with a more favorable attitude toward industrial water
pollution.38
The industries have made some progress in constructing phenol recovery
plants and reducing the amount of phenol concentrations in the Niagara
River since 1948-1949 study of the International joint Commission. The
picture is much less bright for waters inside the state. One glowing example
is the 18, mile creek which runs from Lockport to Olcott Beach on Lake
Ontario. The industrial and other wastes dumped into the creek have so
contaminated Olcott Beach with high concentration of bacteria that the
United States military authorities were moved to put the beach off limits
to all military personnel. The state public health authorities stated that this
was no cause for alarm as the federal government has much higher health
standards than the state. For whatever reason the state is not the most
fervent pollution abater. It is hoped Congress will extend the Water Pollution
Control Act to all navigable waters and their tributaries. An effective law
should also allow a central board in the Public Health Service to decide alone
and on its own initiative what pollution should be abated, subject of course,
to review by the courts.
36. Rivers, The Politics of Pollution, The Reporter, P. 34 (1961).
37. Supra note 1.
38. Supra note 36.
